















Since	mass	 immigration	 recruitments	 of	 the	post‐war	period,	 ‘othered’	 immigrants	 to	both	
the	UK	and	Australia	have	faced	‘mainstream’	cultural	expectations	to	assimilate,	and	various	
forms	of	state	management	of	their	integration.	Perceived	failure	or	refusal	to	integrate	has	
historically	 been	 constructed	 as	deviant,	 though	 in	 certain	policy	phases	 this	 tendency	has	
been	mitigated	by	cultural	pluralism	and	official	multiculturalism.	
	
At	 critical	 times,	 hegemonic	 racialisation	 of	 immigrant	 minorities	 has	 entailed	 their	
criminalisation,	especially	that	of	their	young	men.	In	the	UK	following	the	‘Rushdie	Affair’	of	
1989,	and	 in	both	Britain	and	Australia	 following	 these	states’	 involvement	 in	 the	1990‐91	
Gulf	War,	 the	 ‘Muslim	Other’	was	 increasingly	 targeted	 in	 cycles	 of	 racialised	moral	 panic.	
This	 has	 intensified	 dramatically	 since	 the	 9/11	 terrorist	 attacks	 and	 the	 ensuing	 ‘War	 on	
Terror’.	
	
The	 young	 men	 of	 Muslim	 immigrant	 communities	 in	 both	 these	 nations	 have,	 over	 the	
subsequent	period,	been	the	subject	of	heightened	popular	and	state	Islamophobia	in	relation	
to:	perceived	‘ethnic	gangs’;	alleged	deviant,	predatory	masculinity	including	so‐called	‘ethnic	
gang	 rape’;	 and	 paranoia	 about	 Islamist	 ‘radicalisation’	 and	 its	 supposed	 bolstering	 of	
terrorism.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 earlier,	 more	 genuinely	 social‐democratic	 and	 egalitarian,	
aspects	 of	 state	 approaches	 to	 ‘integration’	 have	 been	 supplanted,	 briefly	 glossed	 by	 a	













Since	the	mass	 immigration	recruitments	that	 followed	World	War	II,	 ‘othered’	 immigrants	 to	
both	 the	 UK	 and	 Australia	 have	 faced	 ‘mainstream’	 cultural	 expectations	 to	 assimilate,	 and	
various	forms	of	state	management	of	their	incorporation	into	the	receiving	society.	Perceived	
failure	 or	 refusal	 to	 integrate	 has	 historically	 been	 constructed	 as	 deviant,	 though	 in	 certain	
policy	 phases	 this	 tendency	 has	 been	 mitigated	 by	 cultural	 pluralism	 and	 official	
multiculturalism.	 This	 paper	 explores	 what	 happened	 to	 social‐justice	 forms	 of	 integration	
under	 an	 earlier	 generation	 of	 labour	 parties	 in	 these	 countries,	 when	 poll‐driven	 populism	
replaced	egalitarian	objectives	as	neo‐liberalism	became	entrenched.	
	
At	 critical	 times,	 hegemonic	 racialisation	 of	 immigrant	 minorities	 has	 entailed	 their	
criminalisation,	 especially	 that	of	 their	 young	men.	 In	 the	UK	 following	 the	 ‘Rushdie	Affair’	of	
1989	and	in	both	Britain	and	Australia	following	these	states’	involvement	in	the	1990‐91	Gulf	
War,	 the	 ‘Muslim	Other’	was	 increasingly	 targeted	 in	 cycles	 of	 racialised	moral	panic	 and	 the	
attendant	 state	 crackdowns	 (Poynting	 and	 Mason	 2007).	 This	 has	 of	 course	 intensified	
dramatically	 since	 the	 9/11	 terrorist	 attacks	 and	 the	 ensuing	 ‘War	 on	 Terror’	 (Poynting	 and	
Mason	2006).	
	
Muslim	 immigrant	communities	 in	both	 these	nations	have,	over	 the	subsequent	period,	been	
the	 subject	 of	 heightened	 popular	 and	 state	 Islamophobia	 in	 relation	 to:	 perceived	 ‘ethnic	
gangs’;	 alleged	 deviant,	 predatory	 masculinity;	 and	 paranoia	 about	 so‐called	 Islamist	
‘radicalisation’	 and	 its	 supposed	 bolstering	 of	 terrorism	 (Kundnani	 2007;	 Lentin	 and	 Titley	
2011;	 Poynting,	 Noble,	 Tabar	 and	 Collins	 2004).	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 earlier,	 more	 genuinely	
social‐democratic	 and	 egalitarian	 aspects	 of	 state	 approaches	 to	 ‘integration’	 have	 been	




This	 paper	 begins	 by	 sketching	 the	 shift	 to	 what	 Poynting	 and	 Mason	 (2008)	 –	 following	
Kundnani’s	(2007)	account	of	the	 ‘new	integration’	–	have	called	the	 ‘new	integrationism’.	We	
offer	some	examples	of	how	the	Muslim	Other	has	been	criminalised,	with	the	various	instances	



















1970s	 to	be	necessary	 to	accommodate	 the	masses	of	 culturally	different	newcomers.	This	 in	
time	came	to	be	the	leading	approach	to	cultural	diversity,	and	was	propagated	and	practised	in	





British	 and	 Australian	 society.	 Despite	 its	 predominance	 until	 the	 1990s,	 it	 was	 never	
uncontested.	
	
The	 second	 statement	 expresses	 the	 opposing	 fundamentally	 assimilationist	 position	 on	
integration,	 that	 always	 remained	 in	 common	 sense	 beneath	 the	 rhetoric,	 and	 which	 has	
returned	to	the	fore	since	the	1990s	and	prevails	today.	The	seminal	approach	to	the	‘problems	
of	integration’	in	the	first	sense	was	put	forward	in	Britain	by	the	then	Labour	Home	Secretary	
Roy	 Jenkins	 (1966,	 in	Parekh	1997),	 advocating:	 ‘Not	 a	 flattening	process	of	 assimilation,	 but	
equal	 opportunity,	 accompanied	 by	 cultural	 diversity,	 in	 an	 atmosphere	 of	mutual	 tolerance’.	
Note	that	it	explicitly	disavows	assimilation.	
	
The	Australian	counterpart	may	be	 found	 in	a	1973	speech	by	Labor	 Immigration	Minister	Al	
Grassby	who,	 in	expounding	his	vision	of	multiculturalism,	proposed	to	 include	Australians	of	
all	 cultural	 backgrounds	 into	 what	 he	 called	 the	 ‘family	 of	 the	 nation’(Grassby	 1973a),	 by	
‘drawing	 upon	 the	 rich	 diversity	 of	 its	 people’	 who	 would	 ‘share	 our	 different	 heritages’	
(Grassby	 1973b).	 That	 ‘drawing	 upon’	 and	 ‘sharing’	 as	 well	 as	 the	 principles	 of	 ‘equal	





undermined	by	 right	wing	 attacks	 that	 characterised	 it	 as	 a	 ‘politically	 correct’	 imposition	by	
cosmopolitan	elites	with	disregard	 for	those	disadvantaged	strata	 from	the	dominant	national	
culture	who	were	 supposedly	most	 disrupted	 by	 it	 (Lentin	 and	 Titley	 2011).	 In	 fact	 the	 real	






not	only	 Iraqis,	had	 their	allegiance	 to	Britain	questioned	and	demonstrations	of	 loyalty	were	
demanded.	The	logic	of	this	positioning	is	that	no	token	of	 loyalty,	no	proof	of	integration	and	
willingness	 to	 belong,	 can	 ever	 be	 enough.	 The	 year	 before	 the	 Iraqi	 invasion	 of	 Kuwait,	 the	
Salman	 Rushdie	 affair	 had	 exposed	 British	 Muslims	 to	 widespread	 accusations	 of	 failure	 to	




Other’.	We	 can	 see	 these	 terms	of	 demonising	 shift	 dramatically	 in	 the	period	 from	 the	1998	
killing	 of	 teenager	 Edward	 Lee	 in	 Western	 Sydney	 and	 the	 associated	 furore	 over	 so‐called	
‘Lebanese	gangs’	(Collins,	Noble,	Poynting	and	Tabar	2000)	to	a	series	of	group	sexual	assaults	





Australian	 society.	 We	 find	 here	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘integrate’	 towards	 a	 blaming,	
supervising	 and	 even	 punitive	 one,	 in	which	 the	 state	 becomes	 involved.	 This	was	 especially	
apparent	 after	 2001	 and	 even	 more	 so	 in	 these	 countries	 after	 the	 7	 July	 London	 transport	














the	 transitive	 and	 intransitive	 senses	 of	 integrate	 are	 used	 in	 the	 official	 reports,	 but	 the	
blaming	 sense	 was	 used	 by	 the	 accredited	 experts,	 not	 to	mention	 right‐thinking	media	 and	
political	 commentators.	 This	 is	 conveyed	well	 by	 Arun	 Kundnani,	 in	 skewering	 the	 notion	 of	
non‐integration	as	‘self‐segregation’:	
	
The	 community	 leaders	 blamed	 a	 lack	 of	 discipline,	 a	 decline	 in	Muslim	 values	
and	 the	 undue	 influence	 of	 Western	 culture.	 The	 popular	 press	 blamed	 the	
community	leaders	who	had	failed	in	their	allotted	role:	to	control	‘their	people’.	
Then	it	was	the	inherent	separatism	of	Islamic	culture	that	was	to	blame	–	these	




‘ethnic	 gangs’	 in	 the	 1990s,	 despite	 the	 little‐noted	 fact	 that	 some	 leading	 figures	 in	 really	
existing	 criminal	 gangs	 of	 that	 time	were	 of	 Lebanese	 Christian	 origin.	 The	 Australian	moral	
panic	 in	 2001	 about	 ‘boat	 people’	 asylum	 seekers	 as	 inassimilable	 and	 problematic	 was	
associated	 largely	with	 their	 so‐called	 ‘Middle	Eastern’	origin	–	 they	were	mainly	 fleeing	 Iraq	
and	Afghanistan.	It	was	neither	Arab	nor	Asian	culture	specifically	that	was	to	the	fore	in	these	
racist	representations,	but	Islam.	The	asylum	seekers	were	represented	as	dishonest,	criminally	
inclined,	 prone	 to	 violence,	 misogynistic,	 and	 (especially,	 though	 not	 exclusively,	 after	 9/11)	





comparable	 crimes.	 In	 these	 two	 instances	 that	 became	 notorious,	 the	 perpetrators	 were,	
respectively,	 mostly	 second‐generation	 immigrants	 of	 Lebanese	 origin,	 and	 first‐generation	
immigrants	 originating	 from	 the	 North‐West	 provinces	 of	 Pakistan.	 All	 of	 these	 were	 from	
Muslim	communities,	and	this	aspect	of	 their	background	was	highlighted	as	 the	crimes	were	
racialised	 as	 so‐called	 ‘ethnic	 gang	 rape’.	 The	 racialisation	 involved	 blaming	 entire	 Muslim	
communities	 in	Australia	 for	what	was	 represented	as	a	general	 lack	of	 respect	 for	women,	 a	
hatred	of	western	culture	and	violent	sexual	aggression	towards	western	women	in	particular,	
attendant	in	the	second	generation	especially	upon	the	refusal	of	the	communities	concerned	to	
integrate	 with	 Australian	 values,	 respect	 Australian	 law	 and	 identify	 with	 the	 nation.	 These	




again	 raised	 as	 a	 racialised	 folk	 devil,	 in	 Britain	 and	 in	 Australia,	 as	 during	 the	 Gulf	 War.	
Ironically,	for	countries	in	a	coalition	that	had	discovered	oppression	of	women	in	Afghanistan	
as	 a	 late	 justification	 for	 the	war	 there	 to	 secure	 ‘regime	 change’,	many	 of	 the	 victims	 of	 the	
accompanying	upsurge	in	anti‐Muslim	hate	crime	were	women	wearing	the	hijab.	As	the	media	
and	populist	politicians,	 in	 the	UK,	Australia	and	elsewhere	 in	 the	west,	 fetishised	 the	Muslim	
veil	as	a	symbol	of	non‐integration	in	the	West,	so	women	wearing	it	were	vilified	and	assaulted	
in	 public	 places.	 At	 this	 time,	 lack	 of	 integration	 in	 the	 form	 of	 deviantly	 excessive	 Muslim	









born	 and	 raised,	 to	 their	 acts	 of	 terrorism?	 The	 popular	 answer,	 contrary	 to	 the	 facts	which	
became	 known	 about	 their	 lives,	 was	 lack	 of	 integration.	 Integration	 therefore	 must	 be	
demanded	by	the	state	 in	order	to	prevent	so‐called	 ‘radicalisation’	which	nurtures	terrorism.	
Whereas	British	foreign	policy,	from	the	latest	Iraq	war	to	Palestine,	was	stated	by	the	London	
bombers	 as	 their	 motivation,	 this	 was	 implacably	 denied	 by	 the	 Blair	 government.	 What	
happened	 from	 this	 time,	 however,	 as	 Shane	 Brighton	 (2007)	 has	 pointed	 out,	 is	 that	 an	






















conformity	 to	 these	 values,	 tying	 funding	 to	 community	 cohesion	 and	 integration,	 policing	
forced	 marriages,	 revisiting	 immigration	 rules	 regarding	 arranged	 marriages,	 intervening	 in	
discrimination	against	women	by	mosques,	vetting	visiting	preachers	 for	English	competency,	
vetting	 visiting	 speakers	 for	 radicalism,	 stressing	 integration	 in	 the	 national	 curriculum,	
regulation	of	faith	schools	and	madrassahs	to	ensure	tolerance	and	respect,	and	English	tests	for	
permanent	 residency.	 This	 is	 integration	 of	 a	 coercive,	 assimilatory	 sort,	 aimed	 pointedly	 at	
Muslims,	and	populistically	articulating	with	anti‐Muslim	rhetoric	about	separatism,	Shar’ia	law,	
lack	of	respect	for	British	law,	misogyny,	and	linguistic	self‐segregation.	Neither	the	succession	





These	 coercive	 approaches,	 it	 is	 true,	 were	 accompanied	 by	 more	 consensus‐building	
approaches	couched	in	the	rhetoric	of	social	inclusion	from	earlier	New	Labour	emphases.	Yet	
these	 were	 often	 transparently	 manipulative	 and	 used	 ham‐fistedly	 for	 surveillance	 and	
suppression	of	radical	opposition.	New	Labour,	in	government	from	1997	to	2010,	had	largely	
emptied	 Labour’s	 ethnic	 affairs	 policies	 of	 their	 equity	 and	 access	 imperatives,	 instead	










born	 Muslims	 from	 immigrant	 families	 who	 came	 to	 adulthood	 with	 the	 accession	 of	 New	
Labour	and	have	lived	most	of	their	adult	lives	with	its	demands.	These	are	preliminary	findings	
from	 interview	 research	 with	 British‐born	 Muslims,	 mostly	 second‐generation	 immigrants,	
conducted	 in	 2012‐13	 in	 the	 Greater	Manchester	 area.2	 The	 project	 involved	 in‐depth,	 semi‐
structured	 interviews	with	 twenty	 self‐described	 British	Muslims	 in	 and	 around	Manchester.	
Equal	numbers	of	men	and	women	were	interviewed.	The	interviews,	of	40	minutes	to	an	hour	
each	 in	duration,	were	 conducted	by	 a	British‐born	Muslim	 (man),	 and	participants	 recruited	
through	community	 contacts	by	 ‘snowballing’.	They	 took	place	 in	 the	university	and	 in	public	
places	such	as	cafes	and,	on	some	occasions,	at	the	request	of	the	interviewees,	at	their	work‐
place	or	home.	All	interviews	were	audio‐recorded	with	the	permission	of	the	participants,	and	
were	professionally	 transcribed	with	anonymity	protected.	 (Pseudonyms	chosen	or	 agreed	 to	
by	the	interviewees	are	used	in	this	article.)	
	





birth,	 by	 citizenship,	 by	 right.	 All	 spoke	 English	 as	 native	 speakers,	 were	 fully	 functional	 in	
British	 society,	 and	were	obviously	 familiar	 and	 competent	with	 the	 culture	and	 idiom	of	 the	
country	in	which	they	had	grown	up,	gone	to	school,	studied,	worked	and	lived.	Britain	was	the	
only	 place	 that	 could	 be	 ‘home’,	 if	 only	 by	 default,	 since	 those	 that	 had	 visited	 their	 parents’	
countries	of	origin	found	themselves	defined	and	treated	as	British	–	which	of	course	they	were.	
Yet	 all	 felt	 excluded	 from	making	 this	 home	 theirs:	 they	 felt	 that	 no	matter	 how	much	 they	
participated	in	practice	in	British	society,	their	belonging	was	routinely	denied	them	in	British	
culture	 and	 institutions.	 Cultural	 exclusion	 was	 a	 continual	 annoyance	 and	 occasional	







instance,	 found	 themselves	more	 targeted	 for	 unwanted	 and	 unwarranted	 attention.	Women	
who	had	begun	wearing	 the	hjiab	 experienced	more	of	 this;	some	women	had	 foregone	 these	
dress	codes	in	order	to	appear	more	integrated	and	avoid	the	targeting.	Men	wearing	beards	or	
shalwar	kamiz,	or	going	to	the	mosque	or	in	the	street	during	a	Muslim	festival,	felt	singled	out	
because	 of	 these	 identifying	 features.	 There	 was	 a	 near	 universal	 sense	 of	 being	 under	

























he	 felt	 he	 belonged	 in	 Britain	 by	 saying	 that	 he	 felt	 more	 Bengali	 than	 British.	 He	 spoke	 of	
becoming	aware,	in	the	mid‐90s,	that	he	was	‘considered	as	the	“other”’.	
	
So,	 this	 idea	of	belonging	 is	 something	 that	 I’ve	 had	difficulty	with	because	 the	
kind	of	conception	of	what	it	means	to	be	British	…	has	always	manifested	itself	
to	 me	 as	 one	 which	 is	 exclusionary.	 Or	 certainly	 one	 which	 doesn’t	 have	 any	
concern	for	what	I	feel	or	have	to	say	or	anything	like	that.	…	I	have	friends	who	



























religion	 or	 I	 couldn’t	 dress	 the	 way	 I	 wanted	 and	 exacerbate	 the	 fact	 that	 I’m	
different	because	 it	will	 just	 result	 in	me	being	excluded	more	 from	 things	 like	
getting	certain	jobs.	So	you	have	to	try,	you	know,	I	had	to	appear	visually	British.	
…	
When	 you	 wear	 a	 scarf	 in	 the	 UK,	 it	 is	 very	 notable	 how	 different	 people	 are	




Not	 only	 the	dress	 code,	 but	 religious	observance,	 especially	 regular	prayers,	was	 felt	 to	be	a	

















She	does	 feel	 like	 she	belongs	 in	Britain,	 and	appreciates	 the	 freedoms	of	British	 society.	 She	




–	 that	 they’re	 not	 integrated.	 How	much	more	 can	 you	 get	 integrated,	 do	 you	
know	 what	 I	 mean?	 …	 Our	 generation,	 we’re	 going	 out,	 we’re	 going	 to	 the	
universities,	we’re	 going	 to	 college,	we	 study.	…	 So,	 how	we’re	 not	 integrated?	






that	 count	 as	 being	 integrated.	 That’s	 the	way	 the	 Labour	 Party	 used	 to	 see	 it,	 too,	 before	 it	
started	echoing	popular	blaming	of	migrants	for	not	integrating.	
	
Amber,	 by	 contrast,	 does	 not	 feel	 the	 same	 belonging.	 Where	 Rabia	 sees	 mere	 curiosity,	
provided	she	is	asked	in	the	right	tone,	Amber	senses	exclusion.	
	
When	I	was	 in	my	training	to	be	a	barrister,	 the	 first	question	I	got	asked	in	an	
interview	 is	 ‘Where	are	 you	 from?’,	 even	 though	 I’m	 a	British	 citizen.	 I’ve	been	
born	and	raised	here	my	whole	life.	And	when	I	say	it’s	in	Liverpool,	they	say,	‘No,	
originally	where	are	you	from?’	Again,	which	made	me	feel	like	I	didn’t	belong.	…	








to	a	comprehensive	school	and	mixed	with	everyone	else	 in,	 like,	my	 locality.	 ...	
Then	I	went	to	the	university	and	I	studied	and	I	worked	with	other	people	in	the	
society.	And	 in	 that	sense,	 I’ve	always	been	 integrated	on	an	employment	basis	
and	education	basis.	And	also	on	the	social	basis	…	Most	of	my	friends	aren’t	from	
Yemen	or	have	no	 connection	 to	Yemen.	 So	 in	 that	 sense,	 I	 think	 I’m	 very	well	
integrated.	And	if	I	do	voluntary	work,	again,	I	don’t	care	who	I’m	helping.	I	don’t	
really	think	of,	I	often	don’t	think	of	myself	as	Yemeni,	I	sometimes	forget.	I	just	
think	 of	 myself	 as	 British	 Muslim.	 I	 identify	 myself	 by	 my	 religion	 not	 by	 my	






any	 differently.	 It’s	 just	 things	 which	 happen	 in	 the	 media	 and	 in	 the	 press,	




There	 is	good	reason	 for	Amber	 to	 take	a	more	 jaundiced	view	 than	Rabia	of	British	people’s	
curiosity	 about	her.	As	 a	14‐year‐old,	 she	was	 violently	 assaulted	by	 two	male	 youths	on	her	
way	home	from	school.	They	racially	abused	her,	saying	things	like,	‘You	fucking	Paki,	go	home!’	
They	punched	her,	knocked	her	to	the	ground,	kicked	her,	and	left	her	bruised	all	over	her	body.	
When	 she	 reported	 this	 to	 the	police,	 they	not	 only	 trivialised	 the	 assault	 and	 took	no	 action	





Recently,	 I	 asked	 some	 policemen	 for	 directions	 and	 the	 policeman	 turned	
around	 and	 made	 a	 joke	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 was	 an	 Arab	 scouser	 which	 is,	
because	 I’m	 from	 Liverpool.	 And	 then,	 when	 I	 asked	 him	 for	 an	 apology	 and	
threatened	to	make	a	complaint,	he	then	arrested	me.	And	when	asked	as	to	why	
I	was	being	arrested,	I	was	told	to	shut	up	and	then	pretended	that	the	reason	I	
had	 been	 arrested	 was	 because	 I	 was	 driving	 carelessly	 and	 swerving	 up	 and	
down	the	road.	Even	though	I	actually	approached	him	on	foot	and	I	was	not	in	
my	car.	And	when	 I	 said	 to	him,	 ‘But	you	 just	 fabricated	 that	 incident,’	 he	 said,	
‘Well,	 my	 colleague	 has	 just	 seen	 you	 and	we	 had	 to	 apprehend	 and	 stop	 you	
because	you	were	swerving	up	and	down	the	road.’	And	when	I	said	to	him,	‘I’m	a	
lawyer	and	I	would	very	much	like	to	see	you	run	that	in	court	so	by	all	means	go	
ahead	 and	 try	 to	 arrest	me.’	 He	 started	 saying	 to	me,	 ‘You’re	 not,	 you're	 not	 a	
lawyer,	you’re	just	a	fucking	Paki’.	
	




they	 threatened	 to	use	anti‐terrorism	powers	against	her.	 She	had	 intervened,	 as	 an	officious	
bystander,	when	she	saw	police	harassing	three	Pakistani‐background	young	men.	
	
I	 said	 to	 the	police,	 ‘Why	 are	 you	picking	 on	 these	 three	 young	Pakistani	 lads?	
What	have	they	done?’	And	the	police	officer	said	to	me,	 ‘Oh,	they	were	playing	
dud	music.’	Dud	as	in	bad	music.	So	I	said	to	the	police,	‘I	didn’t	realise	that	was	a	
criminal	 offence.’	 And	 then	 they	 said	 to	 me,	 ‘Go	 away	 or	 we’ll	 arrest	 you	 for	
terrorism.’	And	I	said,	‘What	are	you	going	to	arrest	me	for?’	And	they	said,	‘Our	
powers	 in	 the	 terrorism	 legislation	are	quite	broad	and	vast	 and	we	can	arrest	
you	 for	 anything.’	 I	 just	 basically	 said	 to	 [the	 young	 men]	 to	 take	 their	 police	
numbers	and	put	in	a	complaint	if	they	feel	like	they’re	being	racially	picked	on.	




rights	 in	Britain:	 it	 is	an	example	of	what	police	often	do	when	called	 to	account	over	racism.	
Our	 point	 is	 that	 the	 draconian	 anti‐terrorism	 powers	 give	 them	 extra	 opportunity	 to	 invent	
cover	 stories	and	 threaten	 retaliatory	charges,	 as	well	 as	 to	discriminate.	These	powers	were	






though	 ever	 so	 slightly	 and	 in	 response	 to	 court	 challenges.	 The	 fear‐mongering	 and	






patriarchal	 and	 sexually	 violent.	 One	 instance	 is	 the	 attention	 to	 immigrant	 Muslim	
communities	 as	 supposedly	 more	 prone	 than	 white	 Anglo	 Britons	 to	 domestic	 and	 familial	
violence,	 and	 the	 attendant	 categories	 of	 forced	marriages	 and	 so‐called	 ‘honour	 crime’.	 But	
recent	events	that	concerned	our	interviewees,	and	were	raised	independently	by	nearly	all	of	
them,	 had	 to	 do	with	 a	 notorious	 case	 of	 sexual	 abuse,	 serial	 rape	 and	 forced	 prostitution	 of	
vulnerable,	 socially	marginal	 girls,	 that	 occurred	 in	 the	 Rochdale	 area	 of	 Greater	Manchester	
(Orr	 2012).	 Those	 convicted	 were	 Muslim	 men	 of	 South	 Asian	 origin.	 The	 media,	 public	
commentators,	some	police	spokespeople	and	many	politicians	pronounced	prolifically	on	this	
case	 as	 indicative	 of	 endemic	 problems	 in	 Muslim	 communities	 and	 called	 for	 serious	
intervention.	 Contemporaneous	 and	 equally	 notorious	 cases	 of	 sexual	 abuse	 of	 minors,	
including	very	comparable	cases	of	criminal	rings	involved	in	grooming	and	sexual	exploitation,	
demonstrated	 that	 the	 problem	 was	 indeed	 serious	 and	 endemic,	 but	 in	 the	 white,	 English	






...	 those	guys	 from	[Rochdale]	…	that	groomed	 the	white	girl	 ...	 [The	media]	did	
specifically	mention	they	are	Pakistani	Muslim.	I	mean	…	was	there	a	need	to	put	
Muslim?	…	 If	you	said	 it’s	 an	 Indian	person,	would	you	 then	put	 Indian	Hindu?	
They	would	 not	 –	would	 they?	 [If]	 they	 are	 Indian	 Sikh,	 they	wouldn’t.	 If	 it’s	 a	






Recently,	when	we	had	…	was	 it	 a	nine	or	 thirteen	…	paedophiles	 in	Rochdale,	
and	it	weren’t	taken	as	in,	these	are	just	paedophiles,	these	are	sick	people.	It	was	
taken	 as,	 these	 are	 thirteen	 Muslim	 paedophiles.	 And	 the	 tension	 that	 created	
within	our	society	within	Rochdale	was	unreal.	…	It	had	nothing	to	do	with	their	
faith;	 what	 they	 had	 planned	 in	 their	minds	was	 absolutely	 sick.	 But	 for	 some	
reason	the	media	had	to	 include	 the	word	Muslim,	and	…	 it	portrays	 the	whole	
community	or	the	whole	religion	in	this	way.	
	





but	 who	 had	 formally	 worked	 for	 the	 police	 as	 a	 civilian	 staff	 member,	 commented	 on	 local	
Muslims	in	his	home	town	of	Rochdale	being	frightened	to	demonstrate	against	the	EDL	because	
of	 being	 collectively	 demonised	 over	 the	 infamous	 Rochdale	 ‘grooming’	 case.	 He	 also	







you	 look	 at	 the	 policing	 of	 the	 EDL	 for	 example	 and	 you	 see	 that	 they,	 despite	
their	 extremist	 activity,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 propagate	 violence	 against	























1	Written	prior	 to	 the	riots,	but	 launched	 in	 July	2001,	 thus	having	a	significant	 impact	on	 the	public	discussion	of	
them.	
2	The	authors	wish	 to	acknowledge	 the	grant	 in	2012	by	 the	Department	of	Sociology	at	Manchester	Metropolitan	
University,	 for	 the	 project,	 ‘Muslim	 Immigrants’	 Lived	 Experiences	 of	 Integration	 Demands’,	 which	 funded	 the	
transcription	of	these	interviews.	
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